

5 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT : Defense Intelligence Agency

1. By Monday I hope to have a memorandum for you to review. My plan is to set forth what seems to me to be the four chief problem areas affecting the effectiveness of DIA and to suggest--without great elaboration--some possible lines of attack.
2. The four main areas of weakness as I see them are as follows:
 - a. Position. DIA has to serve two masters--OSD and the Joint Chiefs--whose needs, outlooks, and objectives are frequently different and often at odds.
 - b. Personnel. Being run and staffed chiefly by military personnel, DIA is hindered in developing the kind of continuity and professionalism that national intelligence problems require for effective solution.
 - c. Structure. DIA's internal organization is characterized by a high degree of centralization at the top and a multiplicity of echelons within operating components. These combine to enfeeble DIA's ability to respond to requirements quickly and clearly.
 - d. Relationship with service intelligence agencies. For a variety of reasons, the service intelligence agencies have managed to hang on to a greater degree of influence in the national intelligence sphere and a greater degree of autonomy vis-a-vis DIA than was envisioned when DIA was created and they were reduced to observer status on the USIB.

BRUCE C. CLARKE, Jr.
Director
Strategic Research